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Abstract
This essay engages the debate concerning the so-called ‘Scotist rupture’ from 
the point of view of Christology. The essay investigates John Duns Scotus’s de-
velopment of Christological doctrine against the strong Cyrilline tendencies 
of Thomas Aquinas. In particular the essay explores how Scotus’s innovative 
doctrine of the ‘haecceity’ of Christ’s human nature entailed a self-sufficing 
conception of the ‘person’, having to do less with the mystery of rationality and 
‘communion’, and more to do with a quasi-voluntaristic ‘power’ over oneself. 
In this light, Scotus’s Christological development is read as suggestively con-
tributing to make possible a proto-liberal condition in which ‘agency’ (agere) 
and ‘right’ (ius) are construed as determinative of what it means to be and act 
as a person.
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Introduction
In A Secular Age, Charles Taylor links the movement towards the self-
sufficing ‘exclusive humanism’ characteristic of modern secularism 
with a  reallocation of popular piety in the thirteenth century.1 Dur-
ing that period a shift occurred in which devotional practices became 
less focused on the cosmological glory of Christ Pantocrator and more 
focused on the particular humanity of the lowly Jesus. Taylor suggests 
that this new devotional attention to the particular human Christ was 
facilitated by the recently founded mendicant orders, especially the 
Franciscans and Dominicans, both of whom saw the meekness of God 
Incarnate reflected in the individual poor among whom the friars lived 
and ministered. In this context, a new spiritual attention to the hu-
man individuality of Jesus was manifest, whether in the realism of the 
paintings of Giotto (so deeply associated with Franciscan spirituality), 
or in the new liturgical feasts centred on the suffering body of Christ, 
such as the feast of the Five Wounds and that of the Sacred Heart of 
Jesus (both of which were first celebrated in the thirteenth century by 
German Dominicans).2 
The new devotional focus on the individual human Christ, in prin-
ciple, confirmed and did not contradict orthodox Chalcedonianism, 
that in the Incarnation the divine Logos hypostatically assumed a fully 
human nature as his own. Already in the early eight century John of 
Damascus held that the human nature assumed in Christ was assumed 
in atomo, that is, in individual form.3 The hypostatic union was thus 
construed to have occurred in the assumption of this human nature and 
not of human nature in the abstract. Nevertheless, the new spiritual 
focus occasioned by the mendicants’ piety drew fresh attention to the 
paradox of the relation of the universal and the particular, unity and 
difference, in the doctrine of the hypostatic union of the divine Logos 
of all things incarnated in a particular human being. 
1 Charles Taylor, A  Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2007), 
pp. 90–145.
2 See Josef Stierli, ‘Devotion to the Sacred Heart from the End of Patristic 
Times Down to St. Margaret Mary’, in Josef Stierli (ed), The Heart of the Saviour: 
A Symposium on Devotion to the Sacred Heart, trans. Paul Andrews SJ (London: 
Herder and Herder, 1958), pp. 59–108, esp. pp. 77–84. 
3 John of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa 3.11 (PG 94.1024A).
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In this devotional context, Dominican Christology in the person 
of St Thomas Aquinas recommitted itself to affirming the traditional 
priority of the universal over the particular even within this new focus 
of piety on the particular humanity of Jesus. For Aquinas, in Cyril-
line fashion, whatever particular ‘humanness’ there is in Jesus, this par-
ticularity ‘is’ only in virtue of the hypostatic union: even while Christ 
assumed a human nature in atomo, the term of individuation of this 
human nature resides wholly in the divine filiation of the eternal Son.4 
Thus, even while Jesus is a  particular human (in atomo), neverthe-
less, he is not a human suppositum – he ‘is’ the Logos of God.5 In this 
way Dominican Christology remained highly paradoxical. Franciscan 
Christology, by contrast, tended to confront the perceived aporia more 
directly, ambitiously rethinking the ontological status of the particu-
lar humanity of the Incarnate Son.6 This can perhaps already be seen 
in St Bonaventure, who reconceived the status of the traditional ra-
tiones aeternae (the universal Platonic forms) as residing fully ‘in’ the 
individuated human nature of Jesus.7 By contrast, the traditional con-
ception of the rationes aeternae had tended to understand them, not 
so much ‘in’ the individuated human Jesus, but rather ‘in’ the person 
of the universal Logos (as Maximus the Confessor would have it, the 
many logoi are the one Logos and the one Logos is the many logoi).8 
4 Aquinas, Summa theologiae III, q. 4, a. 2.
5 Cf. Aquinas, Summa theologiae III q. 4, a. 2, ad 1; ad 2; and a. 5 ad 2. 
6 Cf. Louis Dupré, Passage to Modernity: An Essay in the Hermeneutics of na-
ture and Culture (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), pp. 36–41.
7 See Bonaventure, In Sententias I, dist. 3, pt. 1, q. 1, ad 5. 
8 For the doctrine of the logoi in the Logos, see Maximus the Confessor, 
Ambiguum 7 (PG 91.1068D-1101C). The consequences of Bonaventure’s reconcep-
tion of the rationes aeternae is beyond the scope of this essay; however, Louis Dupré 
has suggested that it is precisely from henceforth that devotion to the particu-
lar ‘human Jesus’ could now in principle elide speculative knowledge in favour of 
knowledge of a concrete particular. The result of this shift, on Dupré’s view, is that 
cognition now comes to consist ‘in uniting a created image with its personal arche-
type, Christ, the synthesis of all ideas’ (Passage to Modernity, p. 38). Thus Dupré sug-
gests that the divine paradigms came to reside ‘in’ a particular such that they could 
now be ‘grasped’ in a way hitherto unconceivable. Under this condition knowledge 
could be reconfigured away from the mystical path of ‘stretching towards’ the ab-
stract uncircumscribability of the universal, towards ‘grasping’ the singularity of 
circumscribed particulars. This situation is connected to how Lydia Schumacher, 
in another context, has suggested that illumination in Bonaventure, far from being 
simply an Augustinian renewal, is in fact a significant innovation on Augustine’s 
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The daring innovation occurred, however, not with Bonaventure, but 
a generation after him, when Bl John Duns Scotus posed a question 
for which Aquinas – inhabiting the high paradox of his doctrine of the 
Incarnation – had no need to raise: How can a divine person assume 
a human nature without assuming its normal human suppositum? That 
is, how does Christ assume a human nature in atomo without assuming 
the ontological conditions of a particular human person? 
Boldly raising this perplexity at the heart of the traditional doctrine 
of the hypostatic union, Scotus sought to resolve it by granting new 
ontological significance to the particular human nature of the Incar-
nate Son, while attempting at the same time to clarify the terms in 
which this particular human nature nevertheless failed to be a person 
or posess its own suppositum. This article concerns the solution Scotus 
offered to the legitimate perplexity he raised. In this article I will ar-
gue that, even while Scotus’s perplexity was legitimate, his manner of 
resolving it risked transforming devotional attention to the individual 
Christ into a means of underwriting a subjective self-sufficiency based 
doctrine, and more, that it anticipates the later Scotist rejection of illumination all 
together (Divine Illumination: The History and Future of Augustine’s Theory of Knowl-
edge [Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011]). On Schumacher’s view, Bonaventure installs 
a ‘metaphysics of exemplarity’ to replace the traditional ‘metaphysics of participa-
tion’, represented for her by Anselm and Augustine. On the Bonaventurian scheme, 
according to Schumacher, ‘knowing’ is reconfigured in a way that anticipates the 
shift to epistemology insofar as it now approximates something more along the 
lines of the grasp of individual ‘facts’ rather than the way of fides quaerens intellectum. 
All this can be contrasted with the noetic way of Aquinas, for whom the journey 
of the mind is not one of discrete apprehensions, but rather a total illumination of 
the mind towards the horizon of unequalisable truth. This leads John Milbank to 
suggest that Bonaventure ‘both apriorises the presence of illumination in the hu-
man mind and tends to reduce the divine causation of human mental light to mere 
efficiency’ (‘The Grandeur of Reason and the Perversity of Rationalism: Radical 
Orthodoxy’s First Decade’, in Simon Oliver and John Milbank [eds], The Radical 
Orthodoxy Reader [London: Routledge, 2009], pp. 367–404, at p. 380). On Milbank’s 
reading, Bonaventure turns out to be less committed to participation than Aqui-
nas, which, in turn, suggests that the Seraphic Doctor already anticipated Scotus’s 
‘break’ with the metaphysics of participation and illumination, and its replacement 
with a univocal conception of being on the one hand and an epistemology of ‘rep-
resentation’ on the other. Cf. Jacob Schmutz, ‘La doctrine médiévale des causes 
et la théologie de la nature pure (xiii e – xvii e siècles)’, Revue Thomiste 101 (2001), 
pp. 217–264; and John Milbank, The Suspended Middle: Henri de Lubac and the De-
bate Concerning the Supernatural (London: SCM, 2005), pp. 93–97.
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on a construal of the person as an exigency of the self to act on his or 
her own initiative. In other words, Scotus’s solution, it would seem, 
contributed to ‘make possible’ a Christian construal of the person in 
terms of an autonomy of the self in ‘affective-volitional and cognitive 
relations with God and others’.9 To this end, the essay aims at a Chris-
tological contribution to the emerging theological consensus concern-
ing what Olivier Boulnois has termed the ‘Scotist rupture’.10 
The Scotist Rupture
Following the provocative study of Étienne Gilson,11 a diverse company 
of theologians have come to identify Duns Scotus as a transitional fig-
ure in the move towards a ‘proto-liberal’ or ‘proto-secular’ construal of 
created being and the exigency of the creature to act autonomously.12 
9 David L. Schindler, Heart of the World, Center of the Church (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Eerdmans, 1996), p. 227. Schindler’s theological critique of liberalism does not 
name Scotus as a genealogical forerunner of the liberal subject.
10 Olivier Boulnois, ‘Reading Duns Scotus: From History to Philosophy’, 
trans. F. C. Bauerschmidt, Modern Theology 21 (2005), pp. 603–608, at p. 604. And 
see Boulnois, Être et Représentation, Une généalogie de la métaphysique moderne 
à  l ’époque de Duns Scot (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1999), and Duns 
Scot, la rigueur de la charité (Paris: Le Cerf, 1998). 
11 Étienne Gilson, Jean Duns Scot: Introduction à ses Positions Fondamentales 
(Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1952). 
12 See Catherine Pickstock, ‘Duns Scotus: His Historical and Contemporary 
Significance’, Modern Theology 21 (2005), pp. 543–584, and After Writing: On the Li-
turgical Consummation of Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), pp. 121–140; Conor 
Cunningham, Genealogy of nihilism: Philosophies of nothing and the Difference of 
Theology (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 16–58; John Milbank, Theology and Social 
Theory: Beyond Secular Reason, Second Edition (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), pp. xxiv-
xxvi and 305; Dupré, Passage to Modernity, pp. 170 and 189; Hans Urs von Balthasar, 
The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics, vol. 5, The Realm of Metaphysics in the 
Modern Age, eds. Joseph Fessio SJ and John Riches, trans. Oliver Davis, Andrew 
Louth, Brian McNeil CRV, John Saward and Rowan Williams (San Francisco: Ig-
natius Press, 1991), pp. 9–21; Olivier Boulnois, ‘Quand Commence L’Ontothéologie? 
Aristote, Thomas d’Aquin et Duns Scot’, Revue Thomiste 95 (1995), pp. 84–108, and 
‘Analogy’, in Jean-Yves Lacoste, Encyclopedia of Christian Theology, vol. 1, A-F (New 
York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 27–30; Servais Pinckaers OP, ‘Capreolus’s Defence of 
Aquinas: A Medieval Debate about the Virtues and Gifts’, in The Pinckaers Read-
er: Renewing Thomistic Moral Theology, eds. John Berkman and Craig Steven Ti-
tus (Washington, DC: CUA Press, 2005), pp. 304–321; Rudy te Velde, ‘natura In 
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Central to conceiving this ‘Scotist rupture’ is the option of Scotus on 
behalf of a  univocal conception of being. Following Ibn Sīnā (Avi-
cenna), Scotus held that metaphysics is the science of being qua being 
(ens in quantum ens).13 Beyond Ibn Sīnā, Scotus specified for himself 
that ‘being’ ought to signify the fundamental concept of whatever ‘is’ 
in its ‘minimal common structure’14 – that is, ‘being’, for Scotus, is prior 
conceptually to every distinction of being, including the distinction 
that maintains between God and creatures.15 In this way, Scotus sought 
to articulate a metaphysical vision that could be construed in contra-
distinction to the ‘analogical’ view of Thomas Aquinas.16 It is not that 
Scotus held that God and creatures ‘are’ in exactly the same sense; he 
did not. And therefore he did not hold that being itself is univocal. 
Rather for Scotus, if we are to think ‘metaphysically’, then we must 
conceptualise being in a mode that is univocal to all things that ‘are’. 
Within the realm of metaphysical speculation, therefore, Scotus held 
Seipsa Recurva Est: Duns Scotus and Aquinas on the Relationship between Nature 
and Will’, in E. P. Bos (ed), John Duns Scotus (1265/6–1308): Renewal of Philosophy 
(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1998), pp. 155–170; David Burrell CSC, Faith and Freedom: 
An Interfaith Perspective (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), pp. 91–112; Matthew Levering, 
Participatory Biblical Exegesis: A Theology of Biblical Interpretation (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2008), pp. 17–35; and Adrian Pabst, Metaphysics: 
The Creation of Hierarchy (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2012).
13 See Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 8, p. 1, q. 3.
14 Rudi te Velde, ‘Metaphysics and the Question of Creation: Thomas Aqui-
nas, Duns Scotus and Us’, in Peter M. Candler Jr. and Conor Cunningham, Belief 
and Metaphysics (London: SCM, 2007), pp. 73–99, here at p. 78. Cf. Ludger Hon-
nefelder, La Métaphysique comme science transcendantale, trans. Isabelle Mandrella 
(Paris: PUF, 2002).
15 On the link between Ibn Sīnā and Scotus, which is traced back to a more 
fundamental source in Plotinus’s conception of the One, see Cunningham, Gene-
alogy of nihilism, pp. 3–20.
16 See Anthony Levi, Renaissance and Reformation: The Intellectual Genesis 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), pp. 30–67; and Frederick Charles Co-
pleston SJ, History of Philosophy, vol. 2 (New York: Image Books, 1993), pp. 476–551. 
Whatever our judgement, Scotus did not criticise the analogical position for its 
own sake, but rather ‘in order (as he saw it) to safeguard, as he believed, the objectiv-
ity of knowledge. Similarly, if he insisted on the univocal character of the concept of 
being, he did so because he considered his own doctrine to be absolutely necessary 
if agnosticism were to be avoided, that is, in order to safeguard the objective charac-
ter of natural theology’ (Copleston, History of Philosophy, vol. 2, p. 484). On Scotus’s 
univocal conception of being, see Douglas C. Langston, ‘Scotus and Ockham on 
the Univocal Concept of Being’, Franciscan Studies 39 (1979), pp. 105–129.
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that all things that ‘are’ – including God – must objectively fall under 
the unity of conceptual being. This meant, from a metaphysical point 
of view, that when we say God ‘is’ we should do so without needing to 
recognise that he is either ‘infinite’ or the creator of the universe. 
Rudi te Velde has shown how Scotus’s univocal conception of be-
ing differs from the analogical vision of Aquinas in two crucial ways. 
First, while Aquinas likewise understands metaphysics as the science 
of ens in quantum ens, his understanding of ‘being’ nevertheless differs 
from Scotus to the extent that he understands being in terms of actus 
essendi. This means that, for Aquinas, having being is ‘being in act’, 
which means that whatever ‘is’ – insofar as it has ‘being’ – manifests 
some degree of perfection related to the fullness of being itself, the actus 
purus which is the source of being. Attendant to this first difference is 
a second: for Aquinas the consideration of ens in quantum ens ‘does not 
prescind from the difference between infinite and finite being’.17 God 
alone is ipsum esse per se subsistens. Therefore, in the words of te Velde, 
‘the being that is God is not so much included within the universal 
conceptual horizon of “being qua being”; God is the name of the cause 
of all beings in so far as they are being’.18 
On the analogical view, what ultimately distinguishes created being 
from God is ‘participation’. God alone is self-subsisting, while crea-
tures ‘are’ insofar as they live, move and have their being in the one 
who is himself the source of all being (cf. Acts 17.28). Creatures are 
not understood as ‘fixed’ self-sustaining substances, but as existences 
subsisting through an anteriorly receptive participation in and to the 
gift of God, the ‘infinite and indeterminate sea of substance’ (pelagus 
substantiae infinitum et indeterminatum).19 What distinguishes God and 
creatures thus is the fact that God simply ‘is’ while creatures ‘are’ only 
through the continuous and sustaining gift of God himself. On the 
univocalist view, by contrast, what pre-eminently differentiates God 
and creation is an ‘intensity’ of being possessed by a particular being of 
which the gulf between ‘infinite’ and ‘finite’ is maximal. In this way, the 
17 te Velde, ‘Metaphysics and the Question of Creation: Thomas Aquinas, 
Duns Scotus and Us’, p. 79.
18 te Velde, ‘Metaphysics and the Question of Creation: Thomas Aquinas, 
Duns Scotus and Us’, p. 79.
19 Aquinas, Summa theologiae III, q. 13, a. 11, corpus. Cf. John of Damascus, De 
fide orthodoxa 1.9 (PG 94.836B).
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univocalist view – conceptually reducing being to ‘the bare fact of ex-
istence’20 – tends to weaken the sense of created being as ‘participating’ 
in God. Or, to put it otherwise: on the analogical view the being of the 
creature and God is logically non-contrastive, since the creature exists 
precisely to the measure of its relational dependence upon the existence 
of God; while on the univocalist view the being of God and of creatures 
tends to be construed contrastively, to the extent that the creature’s 
participational existence in relation to God is no longer understood 
as the definitive term of the difference of created being as such. The 
‘univocity’ Scotus proposed as a mere ‘conceptual scheme’ within the 
realm of metaphysical science, thus tends to colonise our view of real-
ity, morphing from a purely ‘logical’ and/or ‘semantic’ claim (as it was 
for Scotus) into an ontological claim about the nature of reality itself 
(as it became for post-modern atheist ‘Scotists’). The ‘univocity of be-
ing’ is thus, as Conor Cunningham describes it, the ‘pregnant implica-
tion’ of what Scotus intended and formulated as a merely conceptual 
stance.21 This ‘pregnant implication’ has led both Scotus’s theological 
detractors and his atheistic champions alike to maintain that his uni-
vocalist reconception of being is the organic condition of the possibility 
of ‘bracketing of God’.22
20 Pickstock, ‘Duns Scotus: His Historical and Contemporary Significance’, 
p. 545.
21 Cunningham, Genealogy of nihilism, p. 20. Cunningham’s analysis of the 
‘pregnant implication’ of Scotus’s conceptual univocity of being is attentive to the 
subtle way Scotus is not yet proposing univocity as a mode of being in which God 
and creatures exist in the same way (this, rather, is the ‘pregnant implication’ of 
Scotus’s conceptual shift, to be completed by later generations). Cunningham’s 
careful distinction is essentially convertible with the judgement of Kevin Hart: 
‘Contrary to what many critics say, Scotus did not contend that there is no differ-
ence between the being of God and the being of creation. Only God exists by vir-
tue of his essence, Scotus teaches, and we exist only because we participate in God. 
Without a universal idea of being [i.e. the univocal conception that entails a ‘preg-
nant implication’], we could not prove the existence of God: we would always be 
in search of some way of holding together infinite and finite being in our minds. 
The Thomist school fiercely disagreed with the Franciscan teacher, and insisted 
that there is no universal idea of being, only an analogy of being between God and 
his creatures’ (Postmodernism: A Beginner’s Guide [Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 
2004], p. 134).
22 See Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New 
York: Continuum, 2004), esp. pp. 44–52. The most important recent extension 
of Deleuze’s use of the immanentism Scotus made possible is that of Alberto 
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The placement of the figure of Scotus at the heart of this dissocia-
tion of sensibility should not be construed as an ad hominem indictment 
of a man the Church now dares to name ‘blessed’.23 Neither should the 
diagnosis of this ‘rupture’ be understood as suggesting that the objective of 
Scotus himself was to entail the immanentising forces his theological crit-
ics and atheistic followers conclude he did play a crucial role in unleashing. 
Rather the argument on behalf of a ‘Scotist rupture’ is an appraisal con-
cerning – not what was entailed necessarily – but what was ‘made possible’ 
by the intellectual innovations of a figure who stood at a crossroads on the 
trajectory of Western religious thought. The passage from a metaphys-
ics of participation – still felt in the analogical vision of Aquinas – passes 
through Scotus in a decisive way before it narrows towards the horizon of 
materialist atheism. As Catherine Pickstock writes:
The significance of Duns Scotus’ contribution is not that he is 
the sole inaugurator of transformations in theoretical speculation, 
Toscano, The Theatre of Production: Philosophy and Individuation Between Kant and 
Deleuze (New York: Palagrave, 2006). Toscano’s subtle and concrete understand-
ing of the ‘Scotist revolution’ in the ontology of individuation (i.e. the doctrine 
of haecceitas) is attentive to how Scotus made possible the transcendental ideal-
ism of Kant, which, in turn, made possible the ‘ontology of anomalous individu-
ation’  Toscano reads in Deleuze, who, through deploying a Scotist logic, is able 
to preserve the unity of being and concept ‘from the standpoint of individual dif-
ference’ (p. 10). This new ‘science of being’ – from Scotus to Deleuze – becomes 
for Tuscano truly ‘scientific’ to the extent that it achieves indifference to the real 
articulations of being, the generations of individuation and ultimately the question 
of divine causality. Daniel Smith summarises the advantage of Scotus to Deleuze 
(which can be applied to Toscano as well): ‘As formulated by Duns Scotus, … [the 
doctrine of the univocity of being] says that the term “Being” is always used univo-
cally … [And thus it] entails the radical denial of any ontological transcendence, 
and for this reason was a highly heterodox – and often heretical position because it 
hinted at pantheism or even atheism … Deleuze suggests that the tradition of uni-
vocity was continued in Spinoza, for whom God and Nature are one and the same 
thing, and then in Nietzsche. In this sense, univocity can be read as the medieval 
ontological version of the “death of God”’ (Daniel W. Smith, ‘Deleuze and Der-
rida, Immanence and Transcendence: Two Directions in Recent French Thought’, 
in Paul Patton [ed], Between Deleuze and Derrida [New York: Continuum, 2003], 
pp. 46–66, here at p. 55). Cf. Alain Badiou, Deleuze: The Clamour of Being, trans. 
Louise Burchill (London: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), pp. 19–30.
23 John Duns Scotus was beatified by Pope John Paul II at St. Peter’s Basilica 
in Rome, March 20, 1992.
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but rather that he is one figure among many – although a crucial 
one –  in a general shift away from a  focus upon the metaphysics 
of participation (which he tended to reduce to a matter of external 
imitation rather than intrinsic ‘sharing in’), and he is noteworthy 
in particular because he gave attention to these issues in a compre-
hensive fashion. No scholar could deny that such a shift occurred 
… Whatever one’s position with regard to specific texts, one must 
perhaps take a position in relation to this generally acknowledged 
shift away from participation and its relative importance or other-
wise. Put briefly … Duns Scotus and his successors, within an ap-
proach seeking … for complex reasons to emphasise the sovereignty 
of God and the primacy of scripture, opened a space for univocal 
treatment of finite being without regard to theology, rational or re-
vealed. Although this space was not immediately exploited in a se-
cularising fashion, in the long run this came to be the case.24
The claim, therefore, is that a univocal conception of being tends to 
contract the horizon of created being to an immanence lacking trans-
cendent depth because no longer understood as participating neces-
sarily in God. Further, the argument runs, created being in that it is 
now thinkable in abstraction from the cause from which it emanates 
(conceptually breached form the constitutive creator-creation relation), 
comes to be thought in terms self-enclosed and abstracted from the 
transcendent origin, which, in turn, results in a  loss of the sense of 
the constitutive communion of creaturely participation as the mode of 
‘horizontal’ inter-connectedness of creatures with each other. Moreo-
ver, in the subordination of God and creatures to an abstract category 
of ‘being’, what risks bearing the whole burden of distinguishing be-
tween God and creatures (and creatures with creatures) is an ‘intensity 
of being’ construed in terms of ‘power’ or ‘will’.25 Hence, whereas for 
24 Pickstock, ‘Duns Scotus: His Historical and Contemporary Significance’, 
pp. 579–570, n. 2.
25 See Robert Barron, The Priority of Christ: Toward a Post-Liberal Catholi-
cism (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2007), pp. 12–16. In these pages Barron 
briefly traces a genealogy of the voluntarism entailed by the Scotist ‘shift’, follow-
ing it through the nominalism of William of Ockham, the arbitrary construal of 
divine power in Luther and Calvin, Kant’s self-legislation of the categorical im-
perative and ultimately to the Nietzschian ‘will to power’. All of this works to re-
alise, as Barron notes, the fundamental relationship between liberal modernity and 
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Aquinas God wills the good in conformity with God’s wisdom which 
approves the good because God is goodness itself (i.e. what God wills 
is subject to God’s own ‘law’ of goodness);26 for Scotus, by contrast, 
God’s will is the cause of goodness sheerly by the fact of God’s willing 
it (i.e. whatever God wills is de facto made ‘law’).27 God’s transcendence 
is thus construed more in the direction of ‘juridical sovereignty’ and 
less in terms of the gratuitous gift of being as given out of the source 
of being itself. This situation has led Pope Benedict XVI to register his 
own concern: 
In contrast with the so-called intellectualism of Augustine and 
Thomas, there arose with Duns Scotus a voluntarism which, in its 
later developments, led to the claim that we can only know God’s 
voluntas ordinata. Beyond this is the realm of God’s freedom, in vir-
tue of which he could have done the opposite of everything he has 
actually done. This gives rise to positions which … might even lead 
to the image of a capricious God, who is not even bound to truth 
and goodness.28 
With these metaphysical issues in the background, I shall now ex-
plore how certain of Scotus’s theological innovations in the realm of 
Christology may further contribute to the trajectory of the ‘Scotist rup-
ture’ towards a more secularised sense of the self and the world. But 
first, as a  counterpoint to the Christology of Scotus, we turn to the 
Christology of Thomas Aquinas.
Aquinas against homo assumptus Christology
Thomas Aquinas was the first scholastic of the Latin Middle Ages to 
quote directly from the conciliar texts of Ephesus (431), Chalcedon 
a certain mediaeval innovation concerning the conception of God, which means 
that the essential paradigm of liberalism – ‘the valorization of the prerogatives of 
the individual subject … (and) that subject’s right to chose’ – is in fact rooted in 
a heterodox conception of God (p. 15). 
26 Cf. Aquinas, Summa theologiae III, q. 2, a. 4, corpus.
27 Cf. Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, bk. I, dist. 48, q. 1.
28 Pope Benedict XVI, ‘The Regensburg Lecture’, § 25.
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(451), Constantinople II (553) and Constantinople III (680–681).29 This 
alone constitutes an unsurpassably rich contribution of Aquinas to 
Latin Christology: he reawakened the ‘largely Greekless West’30 to the 
inheritance of the Greek conciliar tradition. Positively, this recovery 
led Aquinas to take an increasingly ‘Cyrilline’ position on the unity of 
Christ. Negatively, it led Aquinas to take a progressively more hostile 
view of the Christology of his own age.31 Over the course of his life, 
Aquinas became convinced of Latin Christology’s perennial tendency 
to occupy a more or less ‘Nestorian’ position, especially to the extent 
that it tended to accommodate rather easily the homo assumptus posi-
tion delineated by Peter Lombard, the first of Peter’s three so-called 
opiniones of the union of divinity and humanity in Christ.32
29 On Aquinas’s use of the early conciliar texts, see Martin Morard, ‘Thomas 
d’Aquin lecteur des conciles’, Archivum Franciscanum Historicum 98 (2005), pp. 211–
365; H. F. Dondaine, ‘Note sur la documentation patristique de Saint Thomas à Pa-
ris en 1270’, Revue des science philosophiques et théologiques 47 (1963), pp. 403–406; 
C. G. Geenen, ‘En marge du concile de Chalcédoine: Les textes du Quatrième 
Concile dans les oeuvres de Saint Thomas’, Angelicum 29 (1952), pp. 43–59; Jean-
Pierre Torrell OP, Thomas Aquinas, vol. 1, The Person and his Work, trans. Robert 
Royal (Washington: Catholic University, 1996), p. 103; and James A. Weisheipl OP, 
Friar Thomas d’Aquino: His Life, Thought, and Work (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 
1974), pp. 164–165. Cf. Rogers E. Reynolds, Collectio Canonum Casinensis Duodecimi 
Seculi (Codex Terscriptus): A Derivative of the South-Italian Collection in Five Books: 
An Implicit Edition with Introductory Study (Rome: Pontifical Institute of Mediae-
val Studies, 2001). On Chalcedon and scholasticism, cf. Ludwig Ott, ‘Das Konzil 
von Chalkedon in der Frühscholastik’, in A. Grillmeier and H. Bacht (eds), Das 
Konzil von Chalkedon: Geschichte und Gegenwart, vol. 2. (Würzburg: Echter-Verlag, 
1953), pp. 873–922.
30 Joseph Wawrykow, ‘Wisdom in the Christology of Thomas Aquinas’, in 
Kent Emery Jr and Joseph P. Wawrykow (eds), Christ Among the Medieval Domini-
cans (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998), pp. 175–194, at p. 187. 
31 Cf. Joseph Wawrykow, ‘Hypostatic Union’, in Rik van Nieuwenhove and 
Joseph Wawrykow (eds), The Theology of Thomas Aquinas (Notre Dame, IN: Univer-
sity of Notre Dame, 2005), pp. 222–251.
32 Peter’s opiniones of union are: (i) the homo assumptus theory, (ii) the sub-
sistence theory and (iii) the habitus theory, from which he reserved judgement 
concerning of the ‘orthodoxy’ of each, considering them equally valid ‘opinions’. 
See Bernhard Barth, ‘Ein neues Dokument zur Geschichte der frühscholastischen 
Christologie’, Theologische Quartalschrift 100 (1919), pp. 409–426. On the Lombard’s 
Christology, see Philipp W. Rosemann, Peter Lombard (Oxford: OUP, 2004), pp. 
118–139; Lauge Olaf Nielsen, Theology and Philosophy in the Twelfth Century: A Study 
of Gilbert Porreta’s Thinking and the Theological Expositions of the Doctrine of the 
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The homo assumptus theory of Lombard is rooted broadly in the so-
called ‘Antiochene school’33 of Christology associated with Theodore of 
Mopsuestia (c. 350–428). In his theology of the unio of Christ, Theodore 
aimed to reconcile the Nicene emphasis on the unum Lord Jesus Christ 
(e/(na Ku/rion  )Ihsou=n Xristo/n) with his own sense of the Incarnation 
as an ‘indwelling’ (e)noi/khsij) of the Word in the ‘assumed’ (lamba/nw) 
human being, viz. homo assumptus.34 Peter does not cite Theodore, who 
nevertheless stands in the background of the theory he describes as 
holding that ‘in the Incarnation of the Word a … human being began 
to be God, not in the nature of God, but in the person of the Word’.35 
According to this theory, the union of divinity and humanity in Christ 
is established by a special ‘identity’ of essence between the Logos and 
the ‘assumed human being’, an identity rooted in the assumed human’s 
Incarnation during the Period 1130–1180 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1982), pp. 243–278; and 
Marcia Colish, Peter Lombard, 2 vols. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994), vol. 1, pp. 417–438. 
33 To clarify: the so-called ‘Antiochene school’ (associated with Diodore, 
Theodore and Nestorius) is familiar to modern students of the development of 
Christological doctrine, who are used to contrasting this ‘school’ with its suppos-
edly necessary counter point, the ‘Alexandrian school’ (associated with Athanasius 
and Cyril). However, as Andrew Louth has argued, the whole scheme of ‘a col-
lision of two “schools” …  more-or-less equivalent, broadly-based tendencies in 
forth-century theology’ is a myth of latter quasi-Hegelian construction (‘Why Did 
the Syrians reject the Council of Chalcedon?’ in Richard Price and Mary Whitby 
[eds], Chalcedon in Context: Church Councils 400–700 [Liverpool: Liverpool Uni-
versity Press, 2009], pp. 107–116, at p. 110). What is called the ‘Antiochene school’ 
may ‘correspond to ideas passed on from master to disciple: Diodore to Theodore 
to Nestorius’ (p. 111), but it is representative of ‘none of the sense of some sort of 
compelling movement that the notion of a school suggests’ (p. 111). So when I write 
of the ‘so-called “Antiochene school”’ I  mean nothing more than the common 
Christological tendency that can be associated with the three figures of Diodore, 
Theodore and Nestorius, which was always more marginal and idiosyncratic than 
the contemporary designation of a ‘school’ suggests. By contrast, the situation with 
the so-called ‘Alexandrian school’ is precisely the opposite: the thrust of the posi-
tion associated with ‘Alexandria’ can ‘be found throughout Greek theology: from 
the learned theology of the Cappadocians to the simple, though profound, insights 
of the author of the homilies attributed to St Macarius’ (p. 111) and is thus far more 
universal than the term ‘school’ tends to suggest.
34 Theodore of Mopsuestia, De Incarnatione, 7  (PG 66.972A–976C). Cf. 
J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrine, Second Edition (London: Adam & Charles 
Black, 1977), p. 305; and Aloys Grillmeier SJ, Christ in Christian Tradition, vol. 1, 
From the Apostolic Age to Chalcedon (London: Mowbray, 1975), p. 423. 
35 Peter Lombard, Libri quatuor Sententiarum III, dist. 6, ch. 2, no. 1. 
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receptivity to the abiding power of the Word. Thus the homo assumptus 
theory offered by Peter Lombard tends to minimise the ontological 
unity of humanity and divinity in Christ to the extent that the particu-
lar property of a human nature – ‘a certain human being’ – is assumed 
into union with the divine person of the Son but not necessarily con-
stituted in its suppositum by that person.
Aquinas was, from the time of his commentary on the Sentences in 
the 1250’s, suspicious of the homo assumptus doctrine, which he initially 
judged merely contrary to the common opinion of tradition but not 
necessarily a repudiation of that tradition. However, over the course of 
his life, Aquinas increasingly became hostile to the homo assumptus doc-
trine to the point that he finally rejected it tout court as a condemnable 
re-emergence of Nestorianism. As Martin Morard has shown, this rad-
icalisation of Aquinas’s position against the principle of homo assumptus 
follows directly from the impact of his discovery, in the early 1260’s, of 
the acts of Constantinople II.36 Through his study of Constantinople 
II, Aquinas became emboldened in his condemnation of Christologi-
cal dualism, to the point that, in his mature Christology, he rejects the 
homo assumptus theory with the condemnation of the Anathematismi 
adversus „tria Capitula” itself:
If anyone … tries to introduce into the mystery of Christ two sup-
posits (duas subsistentias) or two persons (duas personas) and then 
talks of one person only in respect to dignity, honour or adoration 
… let him be anathema. There has been no addition of person or 
subsistence to the Holy Trinity (nec enim adiectionem personae vel 
subsistentiae) even after the incarnation of one of its members, God 
the Word.37
36 Martin Morard, ‘Une source de Saint Thomas d’Aquin: Le duxième 
concile de Constantinople (553)’, Revue des science philosophiques et théologiques 81 
(1997), pp. 21–56. First cited in Contra Gentiles, Aquinas’s Christology is increas-
ingly informed and confirmed by the acts of the Constantinople II. Morard points 
to: De potentia, q. 10, a. 4, ad 13; and q. 10, a. 4, ad 24; Lectura in Mattheum, c. 1, l. 5; 
Expositio in Iohannem, c. 1, l. 7, nn. 171–172; c. 12, l. 7; Summa theologiae III, q. 2, a. 1, 
ad 1; q. 2, a. 3, corpus; q. 2, a. 6, corpus; q. 25, a. 1, sed contra; De unione Verbi incarnati, 
a. 1, corpus; a. 2, corpus; Expositio super Psalmos, prologue.
37 Anathematismi adversus „tria Capitula”, V  in Norman P. Tanner SJ (ed), 
Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, vol. 1, nicaea I  - Lateran V, (London: Sheed 
& Ward, 1990), p. 116 [The same in: Dokumenty Soborów Powszechnych, ed. A. Baron, 
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Positively, for Aquinas, the logic of the doctrine of Constantinople 
II reinforced his own theology of the mode according to which the hy-
postatic unity of humanity and divinity in the Son must ontologically 
precede the individuation of the Son’s human nature. There can be, for 
Aquinas, no ‘human nature’ of Christ apart from its hypostatic union 
to the Word.38 This man ‘Jesus’ only exists as the divine person of the 
Son. The ‘newness’ of the Word becoming flesh thus occurs, for Aquinas, 
wholly on the side of the human nature in which the Son newly came 
to subsist.39 This means – rather shockingly under the new devotional 
attention to the particular humanity of Christ – that whatever particu-
lar ‘humanness’ there is in Jesus, this particularity is, nevertheless, only 
‘real’ in virtue of the hypostatic unity of this nature to the person of the 
Word, such that the term of individuation of ‘this’ human nature sim-
ply is the divine filiation of the eternal Son.40 For Aquinas, therefore, 
there is no ‘human nature’ of Christ apart from that nature’s hypostatic 
union to the Word since, as Romanus Cessario puts, ‘the person of the 
Word pre-exists, Christ’s created human nature does not constitute his 
person but rather joins it’.41
In this way Aquinas, without using the language of ‘enhyposta-
tos’ (e)nupo/statoj),42 nevertheless came to exemplify the logic of that 
H. Pietras, Kraków 2001, vol. 1, pp. 288–289]. Translation here modified. Aquinas 
cites this passage against homo assumptus Christology in De Union Verbi incarnati 
(a. 2, corpus) and in the Summa (III, q. 2, a. 3, corpus). In Expositio in Iohannem he 
refers to the Constantinople II against the homo assumptus theory, paraphrasing 
the anathema thus: Si quis in Domino Iesu Christo unam personam et duas hypostases 
dixerit, anathema sit (c. 1, l. 7, nn. 171–172). 
38 Aquinas, Summa theologiae III, q. 2, a. 6, corpus.
39 See Thomas G. Weinandy OFM Cap., ‘Aquinas: God IS Man – The Mar-
vel of the Incarnation’, in Thomas G. Weinandy OFM Cap., Daniel A. Keating 
and John P. Yocum (eds.), Aquinas on Doctrine: A Critical Introduction (London: 
T & T Clark International, 2004), pp. 67–89.
40 Aquinas, Summa theologiae III q. 4, a. 2, ad 1; ad 2; and a. 5 ad 2. 
41 Romanus Cessario OP, The Godly Image: Christ and Salvation in Catholic 
Thought from Anselm to Aquinas (Petersham, MA: St. Bede’s Publications, 1990), p. 135.
42 Mistakenly attributed by Friedrich Loofs in the nineteenth-century to the 
patristic theologian Leontius of Byzantium, the doctrine of ‘enhypostatos’ became 
famously associated in the twentieth century with Karl Barth who, appealing to the 
patristic pedigree of the doctrine, in fact renovated it from Protestant Scholastic 
sources: see Friedrich Loofs, Leontius von Byzanz und die gleichnamigen Schriftstel-
ler der griechischen Kirche, in Texte und Untersuchungen 3, ed. Oskar von Gebhardt 
and Adolf von Harnack (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrich’sche Buchhandlung, 1887); and 
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doctrine he knew and absorbed from John of Damascus.43 According to 
the logic of the doctrine, the ‘double existence of Christ’ (as Logos on 
the on hand, and as human being on the other) is foreclosed. The hu-
man nature of Christ only exists – only ‘subsists’ – insofar as it subsists 
in union with the hypostasis of the Word. As Ivor Davidson, the most 
important contemporary proponent of the doctrine of ‘enhyposta-
tos’, puts it: ‘Jesus is a real man only as the Son of God … [because] 
God particularizes the history of Jesus as God’s own’.44 Therefore, ‘the 
Karl Barth, Göttingen Dogmatics: An Instruction in the Christian Religion, trans. 
G. W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1991), p. 157; and Church 
Dogmatics, I/2, The Doctrine of The Word of God, trans. G. T. Thompson and Harold 
Knight, ed. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1956), pp. 
163–165. The mistaken attribution of Loofs and the questionable patristic pedigree 
of ‘enhypostatos’ has led some scholars to reject the language and the doctrine: see 
Brian Daley SJ, ‘A Richer Union’: Leontius of Byzantium and the Relationship of 
Human and Divine in Christ’, Studia Patristica 24 (1993), pp. 239–265, and ‘Anhy-
postasie’, in J.-Y. Lacoste (ed.), Dictionnaire critique de Théologie (Paris: PUF, 1998), 
pp. 50–51; Aloys Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition, vol. 2, pt. 2, From the Co-
uncil of Chalcedon (451) to Gregory the Great (590–604) (Louisville, KY: Westminster 
John Knox Press, 1995), pp. 282–286; and F. LeRon Shults, ‘A Dubious Christo-
logical Formula: from Leontius of Byzantium to Karl Barth’, Theological Studies 
57 (1996), pp. 431–446. The confusions and objections surrounding ‘enhypostatos’ 
notwithstanding, a number of contemporary theologians have begun resourcing 
the doctrine beyond the terminological rigourism of patrology, showing that the 
logic of the doctrine does indeed (as Barth claimed) have deep patristic roots stret-
ching back at least to Cyril of Alexandria: see Ivor Davidson, ‘Theologizing the 
Human Jesus: An Ancient (and Modern) Approach to Christology Reassessed’, 
International Journal of Systematic Theology 3 (2001), pp. 129–153, and ‘Reappropria-
ting Patristic Christology: One Doctrine, Two Styles’, Irish Theological Quarterly 67 
(2002), pp. 225–239; U. M. Lang, ‘Anhypostatos – Enhypostatos: Church Fathers, 
Protestant Orthodoxy and Karl Barth’, Journal of Theological Studies 49 (1998), pp. 
630–57; Matthias Gockel, ‘A Dubious Christological Formula? Leontius of Byzan-
tium and the Anhypostasis – Enhypostasis Theory’, Journal of Theological Studies 
51 (2000), pp. 515–532; Dennis Ferrara, ‘“Hypostatized in the Logos” Leontius of 
Byzantium, Leontius of Jerusalem and the Unfinished Business of the Council of 
Chalcedon’, Louvain Studies 22 (1997), 311–327; and Philip McCosker, ‘Parsing Pa-
radox, Analysing “And”. Christological Configurations of Theological Paradox in 
some Mystical Theologies’ (PhD Thesis: Cambridge University, 2008), pp. 137–162. 
More broadly, cf. Benjamin Gleede, The Development of the Term ἐνυπόστατος from 
Origen to John of Damascus (Leiden: Brill, 2012).
43 John of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa 3.9 (PG 94.1016C-1017B). Cf. Aqui-
nas, Summa theologiae III q. 2, aa. 2–3; III q. 17, aa. 1–2. 
44 Davidson, ‘Theologizing the Human Jesus’, pp. 141 and 144.
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humanity of Christ has no independent subsistence of its own but is 
hypostatic, or personally real, only as the human nature of the Son of 
God’.45 The individuation of Christ’s human nature is therefore fully 
contingent on the enhypostatisation of the Logos. Or, as Aquinas put 
it, in the Incarnation ‘the eternal being of the divine Son (esse aeternum 
filii Dei) ... becomes the being of man (esse hominis), inasmuch as the 
human nature is assumed by the divine Son in the unity of person’.46 
Thus every gesture towards granting the created nature of Jesus the 
status of an autonomously individuated existent (esse) involves a neces-
sary shift towards a problematically dualistic position. There is only one 
esse in Christ, the divine esse of the eternal Son. Aquinas holds to this 
basic logic: the Incarnate Word is one subject subsisting hypostatically; 
and while the human nature of Jesus is a particular substance, it does 
not possess a propria personalitas and so cannot be another hypostasis 
or suppositum.47
Against this dogmatic backdrop, Aquinas was compelled to judge the 
homo assumptus theory a variant of Nestorian heresy.48 And yet the homo 
assumptus theory remained un-condemned and thus an acceptable opin-
ionem of Latin Christology. Broadly accepted in Aquinas’s day, the homo 
assumptus doctrine flourished moreover in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries among theologians of a so-called ‘Scotist’ variety.49 
Haecceity and the particular Christ
Writing a generation after Aquinas, John Duns Scotus conceived his 
Christology in qualified opposition to the single esse Christology of 
Aquinas. Whereas Aquinas was concerned to foreclose the heretical 
45 Davidson, ‘Reappropriating Patristic Christology’, p. 225. 
46 Aquinas, Summa theologiae III, q. 17, a. 2, ad 2.
47 Davidson, ‘Theologizing the Human Jesus’, p. 141, n. 28. 
48 Aquinas, Summa theologiae III, q. 2, a. 3. 
49 See Walter Kasper, Jesus the Christ, trans. V. Green (London: Burns and 
Oats, 1976), p. 240. Scotus never in fact used the term ‘homo assumptus’, which 
leads Richard Cross to argue (rightly I think) that Scotus did not quite endorse the 
theory, nevertheless it was later associated with Scotus by ‘Scotists’ who used the 
term positively and attributed it to their Master. See Cross, The Metaphysics of the 
Incarnation: from Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus (Oxford: OUP, 2002), pp. 190–191 
and 225. 
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dualism he detected in the Lombardian homo assumptus doctrine, 
Scotus was motivated in his doctrine of the hypostatic union to re-
solve a different perplexity: How does Christ assume a human nature 
in atomo without assuming the ontological conditions of a particular 
human person? It is not that the unum of Christ is of no concern 
to Scotus, very much to the contrary. Neither is it the case that the 
particularity of Christ’s humanity is of no interest to Aquinas, the 
thirty three detailed questions of the Summa that make up the Vie de 
Jesus are evidence to the contrary.50 Rather the dichotomy between 
Aquinas and Scotus here lies, fundamentally, in two different start-
ing points. Whereas Aquinas started from the divine unum of the 
humanity in the divine Logos, Scotus sought to account first for the 
particular distinction of the individual human nature of Jesus apart 
from direct appeal to that unum. Scotus’s solution to the perplexity 
he raised thus led him to perform, what Richard Cross has described 
as, ‘an explicit reification of Christ’s human nature’.51 Thus, whereas 
for Aquinas the hypostatic union so constitutes the ontological real-
ity of Jesus’s humanity to the point that even the cadaver of Jesus 
in the tomb only ‘is’ to the extent that it is in unio with the divine 
Logos,52 for Scotus, by contrast, the hypostatic union does not consti-
tute the reality and being of Jesus’s individuated human nature in any 
exceptional way such that the ‘Word could put off his human nature 
without anything absolute in it being destroyed’.53 In other words, for 
Scotus, it was in principle possible that Jesus could have existed apart 
from the hypostatic union. 
Drawing on the Damascene’s notion of Christ’s human nature as 
a nature assumed in atomo,54 Scotus held that the human nature as-
sumed by the Logos must conform to the definition of human nature 
given in all other cases: an instantiation of human nature defined exclu-
sively in terms applicable to the hypostatic union would not suffice. This 
led Scotus to offer two innovations into the mediaeval theology of his 
50 Aquinas, Summa theologiae III, qq. 27–59.
51 Richard Cross, The Metaphysics of the Incarnation: from Thomas Aquinas to 
Duns Scotus (Oxford: OUP, 2002), p. 12.
52 Aquinas, Summa theologiae III, q. 50, a. 2.
53 Duns Scotus, Quodlibetum, 19, n. 21. 
54 Duns Scotus, Ordinatio III, dis. 1, q. 1, n. 6; Quodlibetum, 19, n. 17. Cf. John 
of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa 3.11 (PG 94.1024A).
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day.55 (1) Scotus proposed a new conception of ‘individuation’ that does 
not define individuality either as a material or an accidental feature of 
being, but rather as a quasi-essential aspect of being, not in the sense 
of ‘pertaining to the order of essence’ but rather as a kind of formal-
ity (but not a  ‘form’); this aspect Scotus called haecceitas (‘thisness’).56 
(2) Scotus sought to demonstrate how an individuated rational nature 
need not itself be conceived as a person, but instead could be the na-
ture of another kind of person (i.e. a fully individuated nature could be 
assumed by a person of another nature).57 Thus beyond the traditional 
Chalcedonian distinction of natura (fu/sij) and persona /  suppositum 
(u(po/stasij), Scotus introduced haecceitas as a  ‘third term’ of distinc-
tion midway between the traditional two. Further, he conceived haec-
ceitas as actualising nature in such a way that a human nature could 
now be conceivably individuated without necessarily being a person. 
Indeed Scotus would thus drain persona of the prior ontological density 
it traditionally entailed, now imputing this directly to the haecceity of 
haec natura, the ultimate positive constituent of existing being.58 In this 
way Scotus attempted to avoid both the exceptionalism he perceived 
in Aquinas’s single esse doctrine and the problem of Nestorianism. But 
this he achieved at a price. As Louis Dupré argues: the effect of ‘Sco-
tus’s solution’ was to detach human ‘nature’ from its traditional link with 
‘a divine destiny’ such that, in contrast to the patristic sense of human 
nature ordered to theosis, 
Scotus’s nature remains neutral with respect to destiny: either it may 
be assumed into an adoptive sonship of God in grace, or it may 
follow its normal course to the formation of a purely natural human 
person. Thus, in Scotus’s artificial construction, intended to protect 
the concept of human nature from breaking under the weight of 
55 See N. den Bok, M.  Bac, A. J.  Beck, K.  Bom, E.  Dekker, G.  Labooy, 
H. Veldhuis and A. Vos, ‘More Than Just An Individual: Scotus’s Concept of Per-
son from the Christological Context of Lectura III.1’, Franciscan Studies 66 (2008), 
pp. 169–196, here at pp. 170–171. 
56 See Duns Scotus, Ordinatio II, dis. 3, pt. 1, qq. 1–6. Cf. Cunningham, Ge-
nealogy of nihilism, pp. 20–22; and Pabst, Metaphysics: The Creation of Hierarchy, 
pp. 282–286.
57 Duns Scotus, Lectura III, dist. 1, q. 1, nn. 35–47.
58 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio III, dist. 1, q. 1.
Aaron Riches50
a theological exception, the actual person who bears that nature is 
no more than an indifferent, contingent addition to it. 59 
Two consequences follow from this: (1) Nature / immanence is now 
‘abstracted’ from the supernatural / transcendent such that the atten-
dant metaphysical dualism of the doctrine of natura pura is now think-
able.60 (2) Personhood is now reconceived in terms of an ontological 
minimalism having to do with (voluntaristic) ‘power’ over oneself.
Scotus’s distinctive contribution to the conception of the person lies in 
the way he re-interprets Richard of St Victor’s doctrine of incommunicabilis, 
59 Dupré, Passage to Modernity, p. 175.
60 Cf. Bok, et al., ‘More Than Just An Individual’, p. 186: ‘For Scotus …  in 
human nature there is no tendency to depend on God (to be an incarnation of 
God); nor is obediential potency for dependence a kind of inclination or openness 
to be fulfilled. So whether or not there is a desiderium naturale in human nature, to 
Scotus’s mind it is not connected with incarnation’ (emphasis is Bok, et al.’s). Bok, 
et al. make this argument in direct opposition to early twentieth century ‘Scotists’ 
(such as Déodat de Basly) who mistakenly considered Scotus’s position on the dis-
position of dependence of Christ’s human nature as an actualisation of the natural 
inclination of human nature to the supernatural. As Bok, et al. show, the contrary 
is the case for Scotus: the hypostatic union does not technically reveal the ordering 
of human nature to the supernatural and Christ is not the exemplar of humanity’s 
supernatural destiny. And yet, Scotus does, in some sense, have a doctrine of the 
natural desire of the human being to the supernatural (cf. Ordinatio, prol. pars 1, 
nn. 23 and 32). In contrast to neo-Thomism, moreover, there is in Scotus an appeti-
tus naturalis of the human to beatitude – hence Henri de Lubac’s famous deploy-
ment of Scotus’s notion of the indispositus of human nature to the supernatural in 
support of his thesis of the désir naturel du surnaturel (cf. Le Mystère du surnaturel 
[Paris: Aubier, 1965], pp. 116–117, 151–152 and 242–244). However, the extent to which 
Scotus’s indispositus supports the full depth and implication of de Lubac’s posi-
tion is another matter altogether. First of all, de Lubac never held – as Scotus and 
Jansenius did – that ‘supernatural vision’ is the ‘natural end’ of the human creature. 
For de Lubac, by contrast, following what he understood as the classical position of 
the Fathers held also by Aquinas, human nature is itself a paradox: aporetically  this 
‘nature’ possesses no ‘natural’ finis ultimus but is created, rather, for the ‘supernatural’ 
finis ultimus of visio Dei, which can only arrive as a gift of grace. Second of all, as 
Alan Wolter has pointed out, the appetitus naturalis of Scotus is not an act or op-
eration but simply the term of ‘an ontological relationship between any faculty (of 
the soul) and that which perfects it. … [Therefore] to speak of the natural appetite 
for beatitude as a “desire” or a “longing” … is to use purely metaphorical language’ 
(Allan B. Wolter OFM, ‘Duns Scotus on the Natural Desire for the Supernatural’, 
in The Philosophical Theology of John Duns Scotus [London: Cornell University Press, 
1990], pp. 125–147, here at pp. 140–41). Wolter’s hereby suggests that the appetitus 
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configuring it now in terms of independentia.61 On Scotus’s innovation, the 
anarchic irreplaceability of personal singularity is compressed into ‘per-
seity’ in order to open the ontological field of haecceitas, thus persona is 
reconceived as a self-sufficing autonomy of ‘independent existence, free 
of any inclination to exist dependently’.62 This is how Scotus conceived 
the ultima solitudo that, for him, defines the human person in terms of 
a double freedom: (i) freedom from ‘actual’ dependence, and (ii) freedom 
from ‘dispositional’ dependence.63 Accordingly, Richard’s definition is now 
mobilised in a very particular direction, which points back to another the-
ological source: the fifth-century semi-Pelagian, Faustus of Riez.64 
naturalis of Scotus is in fact closer to a species of the ‘obediential potency’ de Lubac 
was criticising than it is to the désir natural du surnaturel de Lubac was proposing 
– closer, that is, to ‘velleity’ than to the full blooded quelque chose de Dieu character-
istic of the Lubacian thesis. In part the issue here turns on the complex way Scotus 
prioritises ‘will’ over ‘reason’, thus distinguishing the ordination of the will to the 
supernatural from the ordination of the intellect, which for Scotus is not ordained 
to the supernatural (Wolter, ‘Duns Scotus on the Natural Desire for the Supernatu-
ral’, pp. 131–139). This leads to a problematic situation in which, as Rudi te Velde has 
shown, Scotus, in contrast to Aquinas, holds that there is no inclination in human 
nature to self-transcendency even while there is (aporetically) an inclination of the 
will to a transcendent object (viz. supernatural ‘beatitude’). This makes no sense of 
the intellectual yearning of de Lubac, which even while it is an inclination of be-
ing, is fundamentally a yearning for universality in the form of divine illumination. 
Scotus’s declension from the doctrine of divine illumination coupled with his resist-
ance to emphasise any inclination to self-transcendency within the human person 
allows him to posit a God willed ‘sufficiency’ of finite being. Yet, for the human 
being, how can this be? How can human nature desire a  transcendent beatitude 
without that desire being an inclination to self-transcendency? As te Velde shows, 
for Scotus the transcendent good is naturally willed – incredibly! – as an immanent 
good, and therefore not under the condition of any self-transcending élan of nature 
to the supernatural (see te Velde, ‘natura In Seipsa Recurva Est: Duns Scotus and 
Aquinas on the Relationship between Nature and Will’, pp. 155–170). Dissociated 
from the convenientia of the Incarnation on the one hand, and conceived in terms of 
a desire for an immanent good rather than ‘illumination’ on the other, Scotus’s ap-
petitus naturalis cannot be properly described as a transcending desiderium naturale 
to deification, a constitutive infrastructure of nature to open from within to what 
utterly transcends nature.
61 Bok, et al., ‘More Than Just An Individual’, p. 171.
62 Bok, et al., ‘More Than Just An Individual’, p. 176.
63 Duns Scotus, Ordinatio III, dist 1, q. 1, n. 1, and Quodlibetum, 19, n. 19.
64 Richard Cross, ‘The Doctrine of the Hypostatic Union in the Thought of 
Duns Scotus’ (Phd Thesis: Oxford University, 1991), p. 98.
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In contrast to the ‘ontological’ conceptions of persona offered by 
Boethius and Richard, Faustus offered a ‘juridical’ model.65 For Faustus, 
person signifies a ‘right of power’.66 What does this mean? It means that 
if a person holds power over another (such as a ‘father’ over a ‘son’, or 
a ‘master’ over ‘slave’), the ‘personhood’ of that other is ‘consumed’ by the 
legal power of the one under whom the other is subjected legally.67 For 
Faustus this follows since one juridical unit, as he understands it, can 
be made of many substances and yet itself constitute only one ‘person’ 
because the many substances are submissive to one dominating agent. 
On this scheme personhood is conceived in strictly voluntaristic terms, 
and thus deracinated from the ontological categories of ‘nature’ and ‘sub-
stance’. As Faustus puts it: ‘the person is juridical in the same way as 
a substance is natural’ (persona res juris est substantia res naturae).68 
Faustus’s alternative theology of the person was taken up through the 
Council of Frankfurt (794) by William of Auxerre at the beginning of the 
thirteenth century. William absorbed the Faustusian conception of the 
person into his ‘negation doctrine’ in order to answer negatively the ques-
tion as to whether ‘this’ human Jesus was a human person.69 According to 
William’s doctrine, the difference between hic homo and hic homo persona 
lies in a negation of properties such that a person is simply an individual 
human nature in ‘the state of not being united to a higher thing’.70 Thus 
65 Faustus of Riez, De Spiritu Sancto (PL 62.9B-40A). 
66 Faustus’s ‘juridical’ conception of person was articulated especially through 
a quasi-Nestorian reflection on ‘two substances’ in Christ. As Richard Cross sum-
marises it: ‘The reason he suggests for this is that two substances cannot be com-
bined into one – particularly if one is created and the other uncreated. But it is 
possible for one person to be made ostensibly two persons on the grounds that 
‘person’ does not have the same kind of ontological meaning as “substance” has. 
“Person” refers to some kind of juridical status, such that a person is, say, responsi-
ble (i.e., has dominion over) for the acts of the whole’ (Cross, ‘The Doctrine of the 
Hypostatic Union in the Thought of Duns Scotus’, p. 100).
67 Cross, The Metaphysics of the Incarnation, p. 243.
68 Faustus of Riez, De Spiritu Sancto, 2.4 (PL 62.29C). Quoted in Cross, ‘The 
Doctrine of the Hypostatic Union in the Thought of Duns Scotus’, p. 98.
69 William of Auxerre, Summa Aurea, 3.1.3.8. See Principe Walter Henry, Wil-
liam of Auxerre’s Theology of the Hypostatic Union (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of 
Mediaeval Studies 1963). Cf. Cross, Duns Scotus, p. 119, Metaphysics of the Incarna-
tion, pp. 242–244.
70 Cross, ‘The Doctrine of the Hypostatic Union in the Thought of Duns 
Scotus’, p. 101. 
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William links ‘perseity’ with ‘dignity’ in a straightforward way such that 
‘person’ now consists of an incommunicable individual plus the distinc-
tion of ‘dignity’ which is now perfectly convertible with ‘perseity’: ‘What 
guarantees perseity is the distinction of dignity. And the distinction of 
dignity is identified as the state of non-assumption by the Word’.71 Faus-
tian juridical autonomy in this way becomes internal to how William 
conceives the personal unity of Christ: the human nature of Jesus fails 
to be a ‘person’ because it is lacking the dignity of ‘perseity’, which has 
now replaced ‘rationality’ as the term specifying the nomen dignitatis of 
personhood.
Indebted to the Faustusian conception of the person (as he re-
ceived it through William’s ‘negation doctrine’), Scotus fuses the ju-
ridical conception of the person with the incommunicability of ultima 
solitudo configured as independentia.72 Of course, there is little reason to 
think that Scotus drew on the Faustusian genealogy for its own sake. 
Scotus was not interested to articulate a more autonomous version of 
personhood for sociological, political, metaphysical or even abstract 
theological reasons. Rather, the Faustusian conception in the form of 
the ‘negation doctrine’ is deployed by Scotus concretely for the sake 
of the expediency with which it safeguards the formal unio of the In-
carnate Christ while, at the same time, offering ontological latitude 
from which to introduce the semi-substantial notion of haecceity, 
which Scotus thought necessary to uphold the ontological integrity of 
hic homo. The unwitting result of promoting this Faustusian concep-
tion of the person lies in its ‘proto-liberal’ privileging of agency (agere) 
and right (ius) over being (esse).73 This new ‘proto-liberal’ conception of 
the person ends by collapsing the mystery of the dignity of the person 
into ‘perseity’ thereby exhausting the person of its apophatic, rational 
and complex relational elements, what Henri de Lubac called the per-
son’s ‘unstable ontological constitution’.74
71 Cross, ‘The Doctrine of the Hypostatic Union in the Thought of Duns 
Scotus’, p. 103.
72 Cross, ‘The Doctrine of the Hypostatic Union in the Thought of Duns 
Scotus’, pp. 87–104.
73 And this moreover insofar as Scotus’s conception of the person links up 
with the very sharp distinction he draws more generally between ‘will’ and ‘nature’. 
See te Velde ‘natura In Seipsa Recurva Est’, pp. 155–170 ; and Boulnois, Être et repré-
sentation, pp. 205–212.
74 De Lubac, Le Mystère du surnaturel, p. 149. 
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‘Scotistic’ homo assumptus Christology
The ontological minimalism of Scotus’s conception of the hypo-
static union laid the foundations for a misconstrual of his doctrine by 
later ‘Scotists’, who interpreted the Subtle Doctor in terms of a reinvig-
orated and openly homo assumptus doctrine.75 Absorbing Cartesian and 
post-Renaissance concerns for the status of Jesus’s human ‘subjectivity’, 
the French Franciscan Christologist Déodat de Basly extended Sco-
tus’s ‘reification’ of human nature to accommodate a psychological ‘rei-
fication’ which implied for him something like a parallel human ‘self ’ in 
the God-Man.76 For Déodat, the haecceitas of hic homo legitimises two 
autonomous ‘egos’ in the Incarnate Christ. Thus the humanity of Jesus 
could be said to constitute an individual human being with a human 
‘I’ distinct from the ‘I’ of the Word yet formally ‘united’ to the Word 
according to the doctrine of negation. Déodat’s extension of Scotus, 
moreover, was articulated in terms of a self-described homo assumptus 
position (which he wrongly attributed to Scotus himself ). This, cou-
pled with Scotus’s notion of Christ’s human nature as in principle fully 
individuated apart from its union with the Word, justified for Déodat 
a reapplication of the patristic doctrine of the communication of idi-
oms in terms of a parallelism in which it was now possible to apply the 
doctrine ‘indirectly’ (communicatio idiomatum in obliquo). In this way 
Déodat seems to have suggested that Christ should be thought of as 
more fundamentally duo than unum. All of this was taken up and ex-
tended by Déodat’s confrère, Léon Seiller, who argued that Jesus had 
a  genuine human ‘psychological personality’.77 In these terms, in the 
case of Seiller, we see a distinct move towards a full-blown two-Sons 
Christology where the relation of two ‘psychological personalities’ are 
75 Cf. F.  Ocáriz, L. F.  Mateo Seco and J. A.  Riestra, The Mystery of Jesus 
Christ, trans. Michael Adams and James Gavigan (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 
2004), pp. 120–124.
76 See Déodat de Basley OMF, Scotus Docens ou Duns Scot Enseignant: la Phi-
losophie, la Théologie, la Mystique (Paris: La France Franciscaine, 1933); ‘Le Moi de 
Jésus-Christ’, La France franciscaine 12 (1929), pp. 125–160; ‘L’Assumptus Homo’, 
La France franciscaine 11 (1928), pp. 265–313; ‘Inopérantes offensives contre l’As-
sumptus Homo’, La France franciscaine 17 (1934), pp. 419–473.
77 See Léon Seiller OMF, L’activité humaine du Christ selon Duns Scot (Paris: 
Edit. Franciscaines, 1944); and La psychologie humaine du Christ et l ’unité de personne 
(Rennes-Paris: Vrin, 1950).
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treated as autonomously predicable ‘subjects’. As Seiller argues, in Jesus, 
‘God the Word is the subject adored, in no way the subject adoring 
… the subject prayed to, in no way the subject praying’.78 
The speculative questions raised by Déodat and Seiller concerning 
the status of the human psychology of Christ need not entail a hetero-
dox position. If one specifies the ontological enhypostatisation of the 
human ‘psychology’ of Christ by the divine Logos such that the Logos 
itself wholly constitutes that ‘psychology’, one can, then, make a specu-
lative distinction from which to speak of something like the human 
‘psychological personality’ of Jesus.79 Christ is truly human according 
to the patristic axiom ‘that which is not assumed is not healed’; and 
the tradition holds that he has a fully human ‘will’,80 which implies that 
he possesses likewise a fully human ‘memory’, ‘imagination’ and even 
‘consciousness’. As John of Damascus writes:
[C]orresponding to his two natures he has the twofold set of natu-
ral properties belonging to the two natures – two natural wills, the 
divine and the human; two natural operations, a divine and a hu-
man; two natural freedoms, a divine and a human; and wisdom and 
knowledge, both divine and human.81
However, raising these aspects of ‘full humanity’ requires, as Thom-
as Joseph White has shown, careful and full analogical submission 
to the dyothelite doctrine of Constantinople III (680–681).82 Key to 
a properly orthodox inquiry into the ‘psychology’ or ‘consciousness’ of 
Christ’s human nature requires attention, therefore, to the mode by 
which the natural operations of Christ’s human mind function only 
as constituted within (and in full submission to) the unity of Christ’s 
divine person. This means that the speculative distinction of human 
78 Seiller, La psychologie humaine du Christ et l’unité de personne, p. 17. As quoted in 
Raymond Moloney SJ, The Knowledge of Christ (New York: Continuum, 1999), p. 109. 
79 Cf. Rowan Williams, ‘“Person” and “Personality” in Christology’, Downside 
Review 94 (1976), pp. 253–260.
80 Terminus of Constantinople III in Tanner (ed), Decrees of the Ecumeni-
cal Councils, vol. 1, pp. 129–130 [The same in: Dokumenty Soborów Powszechnych, 
ed. A. Baron, H. Pietras, Kraków 2001, vol. 1, pp. 318–321].
81 John of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa 3.13 (PG 94.133A).
82 Thomas Joseph White OP, ‘Dyothelitism and the Instrumental Human 
Consciousness of Jesus’, Pro Ecclesia 17 (2008), pp. 369–422.
Aaron Riches56
consciousness, which is recognised by faith and thereby sanctioned as 
a valid notional question, nevertheless cannot be specified as intelligible 
existentially to us, as if that human consciousness possessed an autono-
mous ontological status.83 Christ can only be perceived and spoken of 
as a concrete unity. Faith specifies (1) that he is the divine Logos, and 
(2) that he possesses two fully operative and distinct natures. Déodat 
and Seiller, unwittingly or not, posed these valid notional questions as 
if they were existential questions, and thus in terms that radically un-
dermine the ontological and subjective unity of the Incarnate Christ, 
thus departing from a fundamental precept of orthodox Christology. If 
a homo assumptus tendency was a latent risk internal to Scotus’s innova-
tive quasi-Theodorian reification of Christ’s human nature, the innova-
tion became openly Nestorian in Seiller. 
The radicalisation of Scotistic Christology in Déodat and Seiller 
led finally to the censure of Pope Pius XII in Sempiternus Rex (1951). 
Published on the 1500th anniversary of the Council of Chalcedon, the 
encyclical reaffirmed Cyrilline orthodoxy in terms of a tacit condem-
nation of this late Christological Scotistism. Accordingly Pius wrote 
against those who,
desert the ancient teachings more than is right, and make an erro-
neous use of the authority of the definition of Chalcedon to support 
their new ideas. These emphasize the state and condition of Christ’s 
human nature to such an extent as to make it seem something exi-
sting in its own right, and not as subsisting in the Word itself. But 
the council of Chalcedon in full accord with that of Ephesus, clearly 
asserts that both natures are united in ‘one person and subsistence’, 
and rules out the placing of two individuals in Christ, as if some 
homo assumptus, completely autonomous in itself, is placed by the 
side of the Word.84 
In no uncertain terms the doctrine of homo assumptus was rejected. 
This magisterial judgement was reiterated in 2006 by the Congrega-
tion for the Doctrine of the Faith, which described homo assumptus 
Christology as ‘incompatible with the Catholic faith which affirms the 
unity of the person of Jesus Christ in two natures, divine and human, 
83 Cf. Cyril of Alexandria, Epistula 45 (PG 77.233A).
84 Pope Pius XII, Sempiternus Rex, 30–31.
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according to the formulations of the Council of Ephesus, and above all 
of the Council of Chalcedon’.85
maior dissimilitudo and Christological uNio
In the first place Sempiternus Rex sets a dogmatic limit that forecloses 
the later extension of Scotus by ‘homo assumptus Scotists’. To be clear, 
Scotus himself does not fall under the Pian condemnation. Neverthe-
less, beyond the dogmatic limit of Sempiternus Rex, the encyclical can 
be read as an invitation to return more fundamentally to a Cyrilline 
notion of the unio of Christ. Pope Pius holds up, in this regard, the 
Christology of Thomas Aquinas:
He who descended, this is the same as he who ascended. By these 
words is signified the unity of the person of God and man. For the 
Son of God came down by taking human nature, but the Son of 
Man ascended according to his human nature to the sublimity of 
eternal life. And so he is the same Son of God who came down and 
Son of Man who went up.86
In this light, the Cyrilline unity of Christ as it was articulated within 
the conciliar tradition and received by Aquinas is magisterially reaf-
firmed and offered as the fundamental soil of orthodox Christological 
speculation, which animated not only the traditional understanding of 
Jesus Christ but determined at the same time the classical Christian 
account of the relation of God and creation.
Robert Sokolowski has argued that even while the ‘main focus of 
the early [Christological] councils … was on the being and the actions 
of Jesus’, through the emergent grammar of Christological orthodoxy 
‘the church … determined its understanding of God and of the rela-
tionship between God and the world’.87 Sokolowski writes:
85 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, ‘Notification: on the works of 
Father Jon Sobrino SJ’, 5.
86 Thomas Aquinas, Super Epistolam B. Pauli ad Ephesios, c. 4, l. 3, circa finem. 
As quoted in Pius XII, Sempiternus Rex, 33.
87 Robert Sokolowski, The God of Faith and Reason: Foundations of Christian 
Theology (Washington DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1995), p. 37.
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The Council of Chalcedon, and the councils and controversies that led 
up to it, were concerned with the mystery of Christ, but they also tell 
us about the God who became incarnate in Christ. They tell us first 
that God does not destroy the natural necessities of things he becomes 
involved with, even in the intimate union of the incarnation.88
Traditional Christology thus affirms that proximity with God to the 
point of unio enhances and does not weaken the integrity of a particu-
lar created nature. This Christological insight has deep implications 
for how we conceive the metaphysical distinction that must neverthe-
less maintain between God and individual created beings. Sokolowski 
terms this the ‘Christian distinction’, which involves ‘the denial that 
God in his divinity is part of or dependent on the world’.89 In a phrase, 
the entailment of conciliar Christology necessitates that ‘the Christian 
God is … not a “kind” of being at all’.90 This makes possible a rethink-
ing of the relation of God and creation such that ‘difference’ and ‘unity’ 
can now perfectly coincide (inconfuse, immutabiliter, indivise, insepara-
biliter). Because humanity is truly accomplished in the hypostatic unity 
of this human nature subsisting wholly in the person of the Son of God, 
therefore the relation of the human being to God is not one in which 
the integrity of humanity is compromised by unio; but to the contrary, 
union with God perfects the difference (maior dissimilitudo) that never-
theless paradoxically maintains between God and creation.91
Having offered the ‘Christian distinction’ and all that it entails about 
God and the relation of God and the world, Sokolowski suggests that 
all ‘Christological heresies are a reflection of tendencies to make pagan 
the Christian sense of the divine’.92 What does it mean to ‘make pagan’ 
the Christian God? For Sokolowski it means conceiving the distinction 
between God and creatures as one between ‘beings’ that exist on the 
same plane of being. While the ‘Christian distinction’ entails that ‘the 
world or the whole itself is placed as one of the terms of ... distinction’,93 
88 Sokolowski, The God of Faith and Reason, pp. 35–36.
89 Sokolowski, The God of Faith and Reason, p. 37.
90 Sokolowski, The God of Faith and Reason, p. 36.
91 Constitutiones, 2. De errore abbatis Iochim in Tanner (ed), Decrees of the Ecu-
menical Councils, vol. 1, pp. 231–233 [The same in: Dokumenty Soborów Powszechnych, ed. 
A. Baron, H. Pietras, Kraków 2002, vol. 2, p. 224–231; maior dissimilitudo – p. 228 v. 22].
92 Sokolowski, The God of Faith and Reason, p. 36.
93 Sokolowski, The God of Faith and Reason, p. 31.
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in ‘pagan religion’ all distinctions are made ‘within the context of the 
world or the whole, the matrix of being in which one thing comes for-
ward as differentiated from others’.94 On the pagan scheme (of which 
the modern liberal scheme is a variant), sameness and otherness, the 
one and the many, God and the world relate always and only ‘within 
a setting that is ultimate’.95 Within this ‘ultimate’ setting, terms of dis-
tinction are distinguishable to the extent (and only to the extent) that 
they simply ‘are not’ what they are distinguishable from. In other words, 
difference is ‘contrastive’ and ‘competitive’: difference decreases to the 
extent that union is achieved, while union is compromised in propor-
tion to the actualisation of a distinguishable difference of one term in 
relation to another. Thus within the logic of ‘pagan religion’ (and secular 
liberalism), the distinction of one being from another is established by 
a ‘relation of otherness’. 
On the Christian logic of the relation of God and the world, by 
contrast, the difference between the creator and the creature involves, 
most fundamentally, the fact that creation only ‘is’ in relation to God, 
while God ‘is’ in himself and therefore irrespective of every relation to 
created reality. Sokolowski writes:
[I]n the Christian distinction God is understood as ‘being’ God 
entirely apart from any relation of otherness to the world or to the 
whole. God could and would be God even if there were no world. 
Thus the Christian distinction is appreciated as a distinction that 
did not have to be, even though it in fact is. The most fundamental 
thing we come to in Christianity, the distinction between the world 
and God, is appreciated as not being the most fundamental thing 
after all, because one of the terms of the distinction, God, is more 
fundamental than the distinction itself.96
On this logic, uncreated ‘oneness’ is more fundamental than created 
‘difference’ (which is perfected in its integrity by proximity to the di-
vine); or better, divine ‘oneness’ is the first term of the integrity and per-
fectibility of created ‘difference’. Hence, Aquinas’s doctrine of ‘mixed 
relation’, whereby God is not related to the world by any real relation, 
94 Sokolowski, The God of Faith and Reason, p. 31.
95 Sokolowski, The God of Faith and Reason, p. 31.
96 Sokolowski, The God of Faith and Reason, pp. 32–33.
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while the world ‘is’ only by virtue of its real relation to God.97 As Aqui-
nas’s doctrine of the single divine esse of Christ confirms, the hypostatic 
union of the Son constitutes his human reality (which does not exist 
apart from its union with the Logos), so analogously with the ‘mixed 
relation’ of creation, the ipsum esse per se subsistens of God constitutes 
creation, which ‘is’ and subsists only by participation in the ‘oneness’ of 
God. In both cases, the maior dissimilitudo of created being (whether 
of the human nature of Jesus or the creaturely being of the world) is 
constituted by and perfected within a non-contrastive communion in 
which union differentiates. Unio is the ground of maior dissimilitudo. 
This logic of unity as the first term of differentiation is, moreover, in the 
Christological context, concretely Cyrilline.98 
The Cyrilline sense of union as the first term of differentiation 
entails an analogical emphasis in which there can be no ‘third term’ 
situated midway ‘between’ the maior dissimilitudo of God and created 
beings. Authentic communion requires a conception of being and the 
person, therefore, in which the nomen dignitatis is actualised and per-
fected, not through the autonomy or ‘perseity’ of an individual being, 
but through the anteriorily receptive disposition of being’s participa-
tion in the source of being (ipsum esse per se subsistens). Hence, for Aqui-
nas, as Karol Wojtyła puts it, ‘the person is perfectissimum ens’.99 
Conclusion
According to Catherine Pickstock, ‘univocity involves necessarily a logic 
of self-possession’, a logic fundamentally ‘at variance with the theological 
notion that being in its very existence is donum’.100 The theological con-
vertibility of gift and being requires that being is understood in the first 
place as an anterior givenness, being ‘is’ because it is receptive to a superior 
‘other’. This then entails that the perfection of being too is rooted in gift, 
in self-gift and in receptivity, of recognising oneself as being-from another 
97 Cf. Aquinas, Summa theologiae I, q. 13, a 7, corpus; q. 28, a 1, ad 3; De veritate, 
q. 4, a. 5, corpus; q. 3, a. 3, corpus.
98 Cf. Cyril of Alexandria, Epistula 45 (PG 77.228D-237C), and Epistula 46 
(PG 77.237D-245D).
99 Karol Wojtyła, ‘Thomistic Personalism’, in Person and Community: Selected Es-
says, trans. Theresa Sandok OSM (New York: Peter Lang, 1993), pp. 165–176, at p. 167. 
100 Pickstock, ‘Duns Scotus: His Historical and Contemporary Significance’, p. 553.
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and called to being-for an ‘other’. Hence the Second Vatican Council’s 
declaration that ‘man ... cannot fully find himself except through a sincere 
gift of himself ’.101 This convertibility of gift and being confirms funda-
mentally what Pickstock calls the ‘contradictory space of participation’: 
the ‘self ’ and the ‘other’ are not first of all contrastive terms, but rather 
communion is perfective of difference. On her reading, a univocal con-
ception of being tends to call all of this into question: ‘If each finite posi-
tion does not occupy the problematic (even, one can admit) contradictory 
space of participation, then it is identical with its own space’.102 
The fundamental Christological presumption of homo assumptus 
Christology is that the human being is ‘identical with its own space’ and 
therefore the unio of God and man in Christ can only be formal. As we 
have seen, Aquinas held precisely the opposite view: the esse of the Logos 
constitutes the very existence of the human nature of Christ. In this light, 
the Pian condemnation of homo assumptus Christology in itself forces us 
to rethink esse and the metaphysical entailment of the hypostatic union. 
That is, it urges us to return to a more Cyrilline sense of the unity of 
Christ, and thereby to resource afresh a participational and paradoxical 
sense of esse compatible with the single divine esse of Christ. In the first 
place this return is necessitated by the dogmatic limit set by Sempiternus 
Rex, but beyond the dogmatic limit this return proves an exigency to re-
think again the person beyond every juridical reduction. Here the first key 
lies in Aquinas’s axiom persona significat id quod est perfectissimum in tota 
natura.103 In this light persona is the most expansive term of being because 
it is the highest perfection of being.104 And if this is the case, the hypo-
static union of human nature constituted by the divine persona of the Son 
is itself the revelation of human personality at its highest pitch.
David L. Schindler has argued that the essential mark of the mod-
ern liberal conception of the person concerns the person as a capacity 
to act on his own initiative.105 Schindler writes:
101 Gaudium et spes, 24.
102 Pickstock, ‘Duns Scotus: His Historical and Contemporary Significance’, p. 553.
103 Aquinas, Summa theologiae I, q. 29, a. 3, corpus.
104 Cf. Karol Wojtyła, Love and Responsibility, trans. H. T. Willetts (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 1993), p. 22: ‘The term persona has been coined to signify that a man 
cannot be wholly contained within the concept “individual member of the species”, 
but that there is something more to him, a particular richness and perfection in the 
manner of his being, which can only be brought out by the use of the word “person”’.
105 See Schindler, Heart of the World Center of the Church, pp. 275–279.
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liberalism typically carries a definite sense of the primacy of human 
agency or ‘construction’ in the self ’s affective-volitional and cogni-
tive relations with God and others ... That is, the emphasis in such 
relations is disproportionately on both the individual self and the 
individual self ’s doing and making.106 
Against this liberal notion of personhood, Schindler contrasts what 
he conceives of as an authentically Catholic and theological notion of 
personhood revealed in Christ’s filiation and the fact that creatures are 
insofar as they are ‘from’ (esse-ab) God:
Creatures are first from God: they image the divine communio per-
sonarum through the initiative of God in Jesus Christ, and are thus 
born of God’s love. ... The meaning and the dignity of creatures the-
refore lie most fundamentally not in something creatures themse-
lves do but in what they are: in the very being that they first receive. 
Being receptive of God’s love is the fundamental fact about created 
being, the constitutive condition of being.107 
On this scheme, communal participation precedes every autonomous 
act such that the most basic exigence of personhood is ‘to receive what 
has always-already been given’.108 This filial sense of personhood runs 
strictly counter to the liberal accent of personhood, which privileges in 
all things agere over esse.
On his own terms, Scotus unequivocally avoids the error of Nesto-
rianism (however later Scotists misconstrued his doctrine). The distinc-
tion he makes, however, between the haecceity of the individual human 
nature of Jesus on the one hand, and the suppositum of his divine person 
on the other, avoids Nestorianism to the extent precisely that the cat-
egory of persona is reconfigured in a juridical direction, that is, as es-
sentially dissociated from esse. While we ought to allow that Scotus was 
motivated by the good Christological intention to avoid Nestorianism 
on the one hand, while preserving knowledge of the particularity of the 
world and of Christ’s Incarnation on the other, in retrospect we can see 
that his need to de-ontologise the mystery of the person (coupled with 
106 Schindler, Heart of the World Center of the Church, p. xiv; italics are Schindler’s.
107 Schindler, Heart of the World Center of the Church, p. xv; italics are Schindler’s.
108 Schindler, Heart of the World Center of the Church, p. 277.
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a new stress on the ‘individual’ and the priority of the ‘will’) anticipates 
the problematic liberal ethos of sui iuris. Nestorianism is avoided, but 
only to the extent, it would seem, that the nomen dignitatis of the per-
son is deracinated from being and given over to juridical perseity.
The alternative here is to follow Sempiternus Rex, beyond the dog-
matic limit it set, into the radical unio of the Cyrilline Christology it 
proposed as expressed in Aquinas’s doctrine of the single esse of Christ. 
If, for Aquinas, ‘the person is perfectissimum ens’,109 then it is precisely 
in the singularity of Christ’s esse that we find the key to the mystery of 
the person. Here the filiation of the Son is the first term of a receptive 
and Christological notion of human personhood, an idea of the human 
person that inevitably leads into the paradox the ‘contradictory space of 
participation’. The truth of the human person, in this light, lies in the 
unum of the Incarnate Son and the impossible donum of participation 
in his persona mystica110. 
109 Wojtyła, ‘Thomistic Personalism’, p. 167. 
110 This paper has benefited from the generous and critical comments of colle-
agues:  Conor Cunningham, Johannes Hoff, Karen Kilby and Adrian Walker. All 
errors are my own.
